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DOCTRINE OF EXTENDED JOINT ENTERPRISE
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This Article argues that the decision in Miller v The Queen [2016]
HCA 30 is supported neither by common law precedent in Australia nor the
historical English precedents that informed the development of Australia’s
common law doctrines. It is submitted that the majority judgment misquoted
old English authorities to try to equate foresight with intention and argues
that the High Court of Australia engaged in judicial activism, because its
decision rested predominantly on the policy views of the judges. Moreover,
it is argued that the case highlighted the urgent need for law reform in
Australia. The Article puts forward a theory to demonstrate that treating a
person who did not perpetrate the collateral crime or assist or encourage its
commission the same as the perpetrator of that collateral crime is unfair
and unjust. Therefore, this Article argues that the extended joint enterprise
doctrine created in Miller should be rejected in the 21st century.
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INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of “extended joint enterprise” was enacted by judicial fiat
in Australia in 1995 in the case of McAuliffe v The Queen.1 It appears the
judges deciding McAuliffe v The Queen were confounded by Chan Wing-Siu
v The Queen—a 1985 decision of the Privy Council.2 Their confusion about
what Sir Robin Cooke was expounding in Chan Wing-Siu led them to create
a new doctrine of complicity liability. The doctrine of extended joint
enterprise complicity has no doctrinal lineage in the common law in
Australia before 1995.3 There were factual situations involving a common
purpose over the underlying crime, and then there was a collateral crime, but
these cases, when examined closely, prove to be straightforward cases of
intentional encouragement. 4 On the facts as presented in the earlier
precedents, there was ample evidence for a jury to infer that, by joining the
underlying criminal enterprise, the accessory sent a message of
encouragement to the perpetrator in relation to the collateral crime.
Moreover, in these cases, there was ample evidence to infer that the
encouragement was intended to encourage the perpetrator to commit the
anticipated collateral crime.
A similar error was made in R v Powell,5 but the Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom (The Supreme Court) and Privy Council corrected that
1

[1995] 183 ALJR 621, ¶ 19 (Austl.). It is also acknowledged by the majority in Miller
v The Queen that the doctrine’s doctrinal foundations cannot be traced beyond the
1980s when they stated:
These criticisms were invoked in support of an application to reopen and overrule McAuliffe in Clayton v The Queen. By
majority, the Court declined to do so. Among the majority’s
reasons for that refusal was the observation that principles
consistent with McAuliffe form part of the common law in other
countries. These principles are commonly traced to the decision
of the Privy Council in Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen.
Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, ¶ 2 (Austl.) (citations omitted). The majority goes
on to say, “McAuliffe builds on the principles enunciated in Johns.” Id. at ¶ 37.
2
Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] AC 168 (U.K.).
3
The earlier cases required intention and factual encouragement. The encouragement
was inferred by the fact that the accessory intentionally joined the joint enterprise,
intending his act of joining to send a message of encouragement to the perpetrator of
the anticipated collateral crime. DENNIS J. BAKER, REINTERPRETING CRIMINAL
COMPLICITY AND INCHOATE PARTICIPATION OFFENCES 48–49 (2016).
4
Id. at 46–141.
5
R v Powell [1999] 1 AC 1 (HL) (U.K.).
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error in 2016. In R v Jogee6 and Ruddock v The Queen,7 the Supreme Court
of the United Kingdom and the Board of the Privy Council overruled R v
Powell and Chan Wing-Siu to bring the law back into line with the common
law as it stood for centuries prior to Chan Wing-Siu. The High Court of
Australia (The High Court) refused to follow suit and gave some doubtful
policy reasons to justify retaining the doctrine of extended joint enterprise
that The High Court minted in 1995.8
The main theory the High Court in Miller v The Queen used to
justify extended joint enterprise liability was the “change of normative
position” theory. 9 According to this theory, a person has changed his
normative position by taking part in a criminal enterprise to commit an
underlying crime and should, therefore, take responsibility for any collateral
crimes following from that enterprise. 10 The High Court also relied on

6

R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 (U.K.).
Ruddock v The Queen [2016] UKPC 7 (U.K.).
8
There is a similar doctrine in the United States that is comparable to the extended joint
enterprise doctrine in Australia—among other common law countries—namely the natural
probable consequence rule. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-303(A)(3) (West 2008); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 703.2 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3205(2) (West 2007); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. Tit. 17-A, § 57(3)(A) (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.05(2) (West 2017);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.05(2)(c) (West 2017); State v. Jefferson, 574 N.W.2d 268 (Iowa
1997); State v. Edwards, 498 P.2d 48 (Kan. 1972); State v. Filippi, 335 N.W.2d 739 (Minn.
1983); John F. Decker, The Mental State Requirement for Accomplice Liability in American
Criminal Law, 60 S.C. L. REV. 237 (2008). According to this rule, a participant in a criminal
joint enterprise should be liable as an accessory, not only for the underlying crime, but also
for any incidental crime committed by his confederate if it was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of committing the underlying crime. This rule is even stricter than the extended
joint enterprise doctrine in that it makes the defendant liable for any reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the underlying crime, even if the defendant himself did not subjectively
foresee it. Although, the Model Penal Code rejected this rule, it still has fairly wide
application in many states as well as in federal courts. See Model Penal Code § 2.06 (West
2016); see also Brewner v. State, 804 S.E.2d 94 (Ga. 2017); United States v. Wills, 88 F.3d
704 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Miller, 22 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Vaden, 912 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1990); State v. Filippi, 335 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. 1983); State
v. Edwards, 498 P.2d 48 (Kan. 1972); Michael G. Heyman, The Natural Probable
Consequence Doctrine: A Case Study in Failed Law Reform, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 388,
395 (2010). In a recent case, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the mens rea
element of complicity liability requires both that the accomplice intentionally provided
assistance or encouragement and that the accomplice intended the full scope of the crime to
be committed. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1248 (2014). It is not clear
whether this case has the effect of abrogating the natural probable consequence rule or not.
9
Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, ¶ 123 (Austl.).
10
Jeremy Horder & David Hughes, Joint Criminal Ventures and Murder: The
7
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policy considerations to justify extended joint enterprise liability. 11 It held
that criminal enterprises posed greater threats to society than individual
criminals and that the extended joint enterprise doctrine was necessary to
protect the public against criminal gangs. 12 However, none of these
justifications were solid and convincing enough to justify extended joint
enterprise liability. This Article shows the unfairness and injustice of the
doctrine of extended joint enterprise and the doctrinal and normative
grounds on which it should be rejected.
In Part II, the Article briefly examines the common law principles of
complicity liability, which requires intention and actual assistance or
encouragement. The Article shows that precedents in English common law
required intention rather than foresight in complicity liability and that Miller
misquoted old English authorities. It argues that neither the theoretical nor
policy considerations in Miller can provide convincing justifications for
extended joint enterprise doctrine. The Article argues that the policy
reasons13 to promote deterrence are not empirically improved and that they
cannot override basic criminal law principles, such as fair labelling and
proportionate punishment.
The moral foundations of complicity have been said to rest on
culpable, indirect causation. 14 But it will be argued in Part III that this
assertion is not true. This Article argues that assisting or encouraging a
perpetrator is a remote harm because its harmfulness is contingent on the
autonomous, free, and informed choice of the perpetrator to commit the
target crime.15 Therefore, treating an assister or encourager the same way as
a perpetrator is unfair and unjust, because the former is less harmful and less
dangerous than the latter. This Article then argues in Part IV that treating the
actual perpetrator of a collateral crime the same as a person who did not
Prospects for Law Reform, 20 KING’S L. J. 379, 398 (2009); A.P. Simester, The Mental
Element in Complicity, 122 LAW Q. REV. 578, 598–99 (2006).
11
Miller, HCA 30 at ¶ 34–35.
12
Id. at ¶¶ 36, 146.
13
Id. at ¶ 101; R v Powell [1999] 1 AC 1 (HL) (U.K.); see Heyman, supra note 8, at
401; see also Michael Heyman, Losing All Sense of Just Proportion: The Peculiar Law
of Accomplice Liability, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 129, 152 (2014).
14
SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 162
(1987); John Gardner, Moore on Complicity and Causality, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 432, 436 (2008); Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the
Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 407 (2007).
15
Glanville Williams, Finis for Novus Actus?, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 391, 392 (1989).
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assist or encourage the collateral crime, but merely foresaw it as a
possibility in executing the joint enterprise to do an underlying crime, makes
even less sense. It is proposed that such an extremely unfair and unjust
doctrine should be rejected. Part V concludes that The High Court’s
decision in Miller was unsupported and, therefore, should be overturned.
I. COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES OF COMPLICITY AND THE DOCTRINE
EXTENDED JOINT ENTERPRISE IN AUSTRALIAN LAW

OF

The current debate concerns the mental element in complicity and
whether the element should be limited to intention or should also include
recklessness. The current law in England, Wales,16 and most states in the
United States17 requires intention and does not include recklessness as an
alternative fault element. In those jurisdictions, there must be an intentional
act of encouragement or assistance, and that act must be done with the
ulterior intention of assisting or encouraging the perpetrator to commit the
anticipated target crime. The defendant must intend that the perpetrator act
with the requisite fault for the anticipated target crime.18 A further constraint
in those jurisdictions is the conduct element, because actual assistance or
encouragement is required. 19 Association per se is not sufficient for
establishing the conduct element.20 This section briefly outlines why Miller
was wrongly decided. This Article submits that academic research and R v
Jogee demonstrate that Miller was not only wrongly decided, but was
grossly unjust.
A.
Foresight vs. Intention
The joint majority in Miller held:

16

R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, ¶ 9 (U.K.).
Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1242 (2014); Giniebra v. State 787 So.
2d 51, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); White v. State, 919 So. 2d 1029, 1033 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2005); State v. Moreno, 104 P.3d 628, 629 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); Commonwealth
v. Murphy, 844 A.2d 1228, 1232 (Pa. 2004); Wooden v. State, 101 S.W.3d 542, 546
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
18
Dennis J. Baker, Reinterpreting the Mental Element in Criminal Complicity: Change
of Normative Position Theory Cannot Rationalize the Current Law, 40 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 119, 122 (2016).
19
Supra note 16–17 and accompanying text.
20
Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1241; Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 12 (1954); Nye
v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949).
17

72

CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 3

Each party is also guilty of any other crime (“the incidental
crime”) committed by a co-venturer that is within the scope
of the agreement (“joint criminal enterprise” liability). . . .
Moreover, a party to a joint criminal enterprise who foresees,
but does not agree to, the commission of the incidental crime
in the course of carrying out the agreement and who, with
that awareness, continues to participate in the enterprise is
liable for the incidental offence (“extended joint criminal
enterprise” liability).21
Furthermore, the majority went on to say “[t]he wrong in the case of the
party to the joint criminal enterprise lies in the mutual embarkation on a
crime with the awareness that the incidental crime may be committed in
executing their agreement.”22
The High Court held that foresight was sufficient to find fault for the
defendant even when the mens rea for the collateral crime was specific
intention. 23 The High Court also held that there need not be any
encouragement or assistance regarding the collateral crime if the accessory
foresaw that the collateral crime might be perpetrated as an incident of the
joint enterprise.24
In the leading United Kingdom complicity case, the Supreme Court
held that foresight was only evidence of intention and that encouragement or
assistance was needed to establish the conduct requirement in complicity.25
In R v Jogee, foresight of possible collateral crimes was used as evidence of
intention, including conditional intention, in joint enterprise. There was no
independent doctrine of joint enterprise, because all complicity has the same
conduct element under Section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act
1861.26 The conduct element in that Act involves an act of aiding, abetting,
counselling, or procuring. In modern terminology, these categories have
been reduced to two categories of acts, which are acts of assistance or acts
21

Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, ¶ 4 (Austl.).
Id. at ¶ 34; R v Britten [1988] 49 S.A.S.R. 47 (Austl.) (holding that “[t]he judgment,
delivered by Sir Robin Cooke, discussed the authorities, including Johns v The Queen
which lay down the well-established principles governing liability of participants in a
joint criminal enterprise. The judgment gives no indication of any intention to break
new legal ground or to extend the grounds upon which criminal liability arises in such
cases”).
23
Miller, HCA 30 at ¶ 33–36.
24
Id.
25
R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, ¶¶ 8, 11 (U.K.).
26
Id. at ¶ 4–6.
22
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of encouragement. Procurement is a third category, but it only applies in
unusual innocent agency cases.27
Prior to the decision in R v Jogee, Baker argued:
[U]ntil the decision in the House of Lords in R v Powell
changed law, the foresight of possibility rule (i.e. the
accessory’s foresight of the collateral crime as a possible
incident of the underlying joint enterprise), like the probable
and natural consequences maxim, was a mere maxim of
evidence for inferring that the common purpose extended to
the collateral crime …. What was a maxim of evidence has
been invoked as a substantive fault element in complicity
since 1999, which has had the effect of extending the mental
element in common purpose complicity to cover
recklessness….A crime as a foreseen collateral crime of an
underlying joint enterprise was merely evidence from which
an accessory’s intention or conditional intention that the
perpetrator perpetrates the collateral crime could be inferred.
28

In R v Jogee, the Supreme Court held that the law of common
purpose complicity took a wrong turn since Chan Wing-Siu, 29 equating
foresight with intention to assist or encourage and therefore treating
foresight as an inevitable yardstick of common purpose.30 The “maxims of
evidence such as foresight of probable and possible consequences, not only
mirror substantive criminal law fault elements, but [also] have been blurred
with them for centuries.”31 Thus, the substantive fault doctrine in crimes of
27

See Matusevich v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 633, ¶ 3 (Austl.); see also David
Lanham, Complicity, Concert and Conspiracy, 4 CRIM. L.J. 276, 278–79 (1980).
28
BAKER, supra note 3, at xxxiv.
29
Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] AC 168 (U.K.).
30
Jogee, UKSC at ¶ 87. There are some other voices contending that Chan Wing-Siu
did not take a wrong turn and that the Supreme Court’s judgement in Jogee is not
strongly convincing. See Richard Buxton, Jogee: Upheaval in Secondary Liability for
Murder, 5 CRIM. L. REV. 324, 328 (2016); A. P. Simester, Accessory Liability and
Common Unlawful Purposes, 133 LAW Q. REV. 73, 76 (2017); Findlay Stark, The
Demise of “Parasitic Accessorial Liability”: Substantive Judicial Law Reform, not
Common Law Housekeeping, 75 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 550 (2016); David Ormerod & Karl
Laird, Jogee: Not the End of a Legal Saga but the Start of One?, 8 CRIM. L. REV. 539,
552 (2016).
31
Dennis J. Baker, Foresight in Common Purpose Complicity/Joint Enterprise
Complicity: It is a Maxim of Evidence, not a Substantive Fault Element, (manuscript at
51), https://ssrn.com/abstract= 2507529; Baker, supra note 18, at 243.
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recklessness is foresight of a possibility or probability that the prohibited
consequence or conduct might occur. In crimes of negligence, the
substantive fault element is what a reasonable person would have foreseen
as the possible or probable consequence or conduct of the given action. A
reasonable person might foresee that the “conduct” he is assisting will be
rape, even though the defendant did not intend as much. Added to this mix
is the maxim that foresight of a virtual certainty can be used to infer that the
virtual certainty was intended.32 Scholars have also suggested that foresight
of a virtual certainty can be a substantive fault doctrine for crimes such as
murder, 33 rather than just an evidential standard 34 for inferring direct
intention.35
The High Court of Australia delivered an insightful judgement on
the law of complicity in 1985, where Chief Justice Gibbs held:
The very words used in s.351, and the synonyms which
express their meanings - e.g. help, encourage, advise,
persuade, induce, bring about by effort - indicate that a
particular state of mind is essential before a person can
become liable as a secondary party for the commission of an
offence, even if the offence is one of strict liability. . . . “It
will be observed that all these definitions have nothing
whatever to do with the probability that the forbidden result
would follow upon the accessory’s conduct; and that they all
demand that he in some sort associate himself with the
venture, that he participate in it as in something that he
wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it
succeed. All the words used - even the most colourless ‘abet’
- carry an implication of purposive attitude towards it.”36

32

R v Woollin [1998] 1 AC 82, 96 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
Alan R. White, Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire, 92 LAW Q. REV. 569, 570
(1976); Glanville Williams, Oblique Intention, 46 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 417, 424 (1987).
34
R v Matthews [2003] 2 Crim. App. 461, 476 (U.K.) (suggesting it is mere evidence
of direct intention and therefore is not also an alternative substantive fault element for
murder).
35
A P SIMESTER ET AL., SIMESTER AND SULLIVAN’S CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND
DOCTRINE 143 (6th ed. 2016); Walter Wheeler Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive in the
Criminal Law, 26 YALE L.J. 645, 655–56 (1916).
36
Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473, ¶ 6 (Austl.) (citation omitted). Gibbs
C.J. uses the term willful blindness to refer to oblique intention, which does make his
judgment appear somewhat confused. He states:
33
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Chief Justice Gibbs held that knowledge can be used to infer
intention and that oblique intention can be inferred in cases where the
defendant believed, as a matter of virtual certainty, that a circumstance
existed and deliberately avoided checking whether it did or would exist.37
The judgment uses confusing terminology to try to explain that a belief that
it is virtually certain that a circumstance exists is the same thing as actual
knowledge, because it used the ambiguous term “wilful blindness.” 38
Notwithstanding that issue, it is clear that the case does not allow
recklessness as an alternative substantive fault element in complicity.39 In
2014, Justice Learned Hand’s interpretation of the law, which persuaded
Chief Justice Gibbs, was invoked by the Supreme Court of the United
States40 to support its interpretation of the law as requiring intention, even
though Peoni41 itself was argued as a natural, probable consequence case.
The majority in Miller might assert that the decision in Giorgianni v The
Queen does not apply, since the facts in that case did not involve a joint
enterprise.42 After all, the High Court held that “extended joint enterprise” is
a sui generis doctrine. 43 The High Court claims the doctrine started to
develop in Johns v The Queen,44 but scholars have argued to the contrary
that Johns supports R v Jogee.45 The majority in R v Jogee also held that
Johns supported its decision. 46 More importantly, there is a line of
Further it is not correct to say that a person may be convicted of
aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an
offence simply because he has acted recklessly . . . Recklessness, in
the sense of not caring whether the facts exist or not, would be
relevant only if it too was virtually equivalent to knowledge, in other
words only if it amounted to wilful blindness.
Id. at ¶ 15.
37
Id.
38
Id. at ¶ 17.
39
Id. at 15.
40
Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1250 (2014).
41
“The prosecution's argument is that, as Peoni put the bills in circulation and knew
that Regno would be likely . . . to sell them to another guilty possessor, the possession
of the second buyer was a natural consequence of Peoni’s original act, with which he
might be charged.” United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938).
42
See Clayton v The Queen [2006] HCA 58, ¶ 102 (Austl.); Gillard v The Queen
[2003] HCA 64, ¶ 50 (Austl.).
43
Clayton, HCA 58 at ¶ 20.
44
Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, ¶ 37 (Austl.).
45
Baker, supra note 18, at 218 n.408.
46
R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, ¶ 67 (U.K.).
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significant Australian authorities involving joint enterprise factual situations
that all hold that the mental element in complicity is intention.47 The general
principle announced in these cases is taken from the poaching cases referred
to in R v Jogee.48
The law in Australia before McAuliffe is summarised in a passage
from R v Surridge:
Thus, if two persons agree that one of them shall kill or
inflict grievous bodily harm on another party whilst the other
stands by and keeps watch or otherwise assists, the latter is
guilty of murder as an accomplice if the third party is killed,
since he is a principal in the second degree. Again, if they
agree that the active party shall commit a crime, and agree
also, expressly or tacitly, that if resistance is offered any
necessary violence may be used to overcome it, including
killing or inflicting grievous bodily harm, then if the active
party intentionally kills or inflicts grievous bodily harm
which causes death, in order to overcome resistance, the
other party is guilty of murder, because the killing was within
the common purpose. If the killing amounted only to
manslaughter by the active party, the other party is also guilty
only of manslaughter. 49
These cases adopt the general principle that can be traced right back
to Lord Dacre’s Case,50 although there have been aberrant decisions over
the centuries. Unquestionably, the natural, probable consequence doctrine
and the foresight of possibility doctrine have both been used as substitutes
for a doctrine of intention in some cases over the centuries, 51 but the
scholarly research demonstrates that the bulk of cases require intention. 52
This also is buttressed by the supporting arguments, principles, and
precedents quoted in the dissenting judgments of Justice Kirby in Clayton v

47

R v Johns (1978) 1 NSWLR 284, 285–86 (Austl.); R v Doorey (1970) 3 NSWLR
351, 353 (Austl.); R v Dunn (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 210, 214 (Austl.); R v Kalinowski
(1930) 31 SR (NSW) 377, 380–81 (Austl.); R v Surridge (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 278,
282–83 (Austl.); R v Adams [1932] VLR 222, 223–24 (Austl.); R v Grand (1903) 3 SR
(NSW) 216, 218 (Austl.); R v Dowdle (1900) 26 VLR 637, 639–41 (Austl.).
48
Jogee, UKSC 8 at ¶ 23.
49
R v Surridge (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 278, 282–83 (Austl.).
50
Le Seignior Dacres’ Case, [1535] 72 Eng. Rep. 458.
51
Jogee, UKSC 8 at ¶ 20 (U.K.).
52
BAKER, supra note 3, ch 2.
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The Queen53 and Justice Gageler J in Miller. However, ever since McAuliffe,
the Australian law followed the Chan Wing-Siu approach, which has now
been reconfirmed in Miller. Yet the majority in Miller54 misquoted Foster by
failing to quote in full the passages from Foster, so the meaning and context
of what was being asserted was lost. Foster stated:
If the principal totally and substantially varieth, if being
solicited to commit a felony of one kind he wilfully and
knowingly committeth a felony of another, he will stand
single in that Offence, and the person soliciting will not be
involved in his guilt.
...
But if the principal in substance complieth with the
temptation, varying only in circumstance of time or place, or
in the manner of execution, in these cases the person
soliciting to the offence will, if absent, be an accessary before
the fact, if present a principal. For the substantial, the
criminal part of the temptation, be it advice, command, or
hire, is complied with. A. commandeth B. to murder C. by
poison, B. doth it by sword, or other weapon, or by any other
means. A. is accessary to this murder: for the murder of C,
was the object principally in his contemplation, and that is
effected.
...
So where the principal goeth beyond the terms of the
solicitation, if in the event the felony committed was a
probable consequence of what was ordered or advised, the
person giving such orders or advice will be an accessary to
that felony. A., upon some affront given by B., ordereth his
servant to way-lay him and give him a sound beating; the
servant doth so, and B. dieth of this beating. A. is accessary
to this murder. 55
53

Clayton v The Queen [2006] HCA 58, ¶¶ 31–33 (Austl.).
The majority in Miller v The Queen referenced the use of the “natural probable
consequence” maxim out of the context in which Foster discussed and applied it.
Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, ¶ 6 (Austl.). The majority in R v Jogee also quote
the wrong passages from Foster, but seem not to confuse the evidential maxim from
the substantive fault element. Jogee, UKSC 8 at ¶ 20–21 (U.K.).
55
MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION FOR THE
TRIAL OF THE REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746, IN THE COUNTY SURRY; AND OF OTHER
CROWN CASES: TO WHICH ARE ADDED DISCOURSES UPON A FEW BRANCHES OF THE
CROWN LAW 369–70 (3d ed., 1809).
54
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Thereafter, Foster referred to what would now be conceptualised as a
conditional intention case and an oblique intention case. 56 When these
passages are read in full, it is plain for all to see that they do not adopt
objective fault as the substantive fault element. The facts in these cases refer
to direct instigation, where the accessory directly or obliquely intends the
end crime, and therefore it is irrelevant whether different means are used by
the perpetrator to achieve that intended end. 57 These cases also refer to
unintended consequences (consequences that are unintended but which
might be said to be a natural probable consequence) flowing from acts that
the defendant intended to encourage the plaintiff to perpetrate. Foster stated
that it is no defense for the defendant to assert that he or she only intended
the plaintiff to inflict great bodily harm, if that harm causes the victim’s
death—since a natural probable consequence of great bodily harm could be
death. The probability of death being caused by such is debatable, but that is
beside the point, since this is no more than an early maxim for inferring fault
and equally an early attempt to justify constructive liability for both the
accessory and perpetrator. None of these cases refer to joint enterprise
liability. Foster’s view on joint enterprises was stated in the Three Soldiers
case.58 The Three Soldiers case required a common intention with respect to
any collateral crime and, like Lord Dacre’s Case59 and the later poaching
cases from the 1800s onwards,60 which are accepted as authoritative in R v
Jogee, it developed and set the fault element for complicity.
However, the majority decision in Miller does not accept either of
these propositions. 61 That decision holds that fault can be established in
complicity cases if the accessory’s state of mind involved either intentional
association, assistance, or encouragement or reckless association, assistance,
56

Id. at 370. Foster provides examples of a conditional intention, stating, “A. adviseth
B. to rob C., He doth rob him, and in so doing, either upon resistance made, or to
conceal the fact, or upon any other motive operating at the time of the robbery, killeth
him. A. is [an] accessary to this murder.” Foster provides an example of an oblique
intention, stating, “A. soliciteth B. to burn the house of C., he doth it; and the flames
taking hold of the house of D. that likewise is burnt. A. is [an] accessary to the burning
of this latter house.” Id.
57
BAKER, supra note 3, at 226–39.
58
FOSTER, supra note 55, at 353 (describing the facts surrounding The Three Soldiers
Case).
59
Le Seignior Dacres’ Case, [1535] 72 Eng. Rep. 458.
60
See BAKER, supra note 3, at 79, 106 (analyzing the poaching cases in Australian
law); see also R v Dunn (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 210, 214 (Austl.).
61
See generally Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30 (Austl.).
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or encouragement.62 The majority in Miller misquote Stephen by giving a
selection of quotes from Stephen out of context and in isolation from his
views on joint enterprise. 63 If they had quoted the Article immediately
below the one quoted from Stephen’s Digest of the Criminal Law, the entire
meaning of Stephen’s statement in that Article would have been apparent.
Stephen did not adopt an objective fault element for complicity in his
own books. 64 The quotations referred to in Miller were discussing
accessorial liability in cases where the perpetrator was constructively liable
for an unintended consequence of an intended act. 65 Beyond that, the
quotations in Miller simply reiterate the statement of the law from Foster,
which was that it is no defence to accessorial murder that the perpetrator
used different means from what the accessory intended to be used.66 Foster,
on the very next page of the decision, continues his analysis with reference
to transferred malice and the famous case of Archer and Saunders.67 But
Stephen’s views about joint enterprise liability are not in the passages
quoted by the High Court. Instead, Stephen quotes the Three Soldiers case
and R v Plummer 68 under a different Article in his digest concerning
common purpose fact scenarios.69
However, the majority in R v. Jogee removed the need for further
discussion, as that decision noted that the objective test has not been a part
of the common law for 300 years, if it ever was. Consequently, it is hard to
see how that test has any relevance on the current law. Justice Gageler got
the gist of this when he stated:
[t]he common law for a long time treated intention as a
matter for objective determination: a party was taken to
intend a probable consequence of an act which that party did
or to which that party agreed. Early commentaries on
criminal liability at common law, particularly those of Sir
Michael Foster in the middle of the eighteenth century and
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Id. at ¶ 84.
Id. at ¶ 13–16.
64
BAKER, supra note 3, at 235.
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Miller, HCA 30 at ¶ 12.
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Id.
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FOSTER, supra note 55, at 353.
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R v Plummer, [1706] 84 Eng. Rep. 1103.
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Sir James Stephen in the second half of the nineteenth
century, need to be read cautiously in that light.70
B.

The Court’s Reasons Why Extended Joint Enterprise Should be
Retained

The most controversial theory to justify a doctrine of extended joint
enterprise invoked in Miller 71 is Professor A. P. Simester’s “change of
normative position” theory, presented in a 2006 paper.72 According to the
change of normative position theory, a participant who voluntarily and
intentionally joins a criminal enterprise has changed his normative position
and therefore should be made fully liable for any collateral crime he foresaw
as a possibility.
However, such an explanation overlooks the difference between
individual perpetration liability and extended joint enterprise complicity
liability. In an individual perpetration liability situation, such as assault
occasioning actual bodily harm, it is the defendant’s own act which results
in the unintended harm. However, in the context of extended joint enterprise
liability, it is another autonomous and independent human being’s act (the
perpetrator’s act) that results in the unintended harm proscribed in the
collateral crime. A person who assaults his victim and then causes
unintended harm has control, at least, over his own conduct that has caused
the unintended harm. But a participant in an extended joint criminal
enterprise case has no control over the perpetrator’s independent conduct
that caused the unintended harm. The participant merely has assisted or
encouraged the perpetrator to do the underlying crime, but he has no control
over whether the perpetrator will commit other collateral crimes.
The change of normative position theory faces strong challenges in
trying to justify constructive liability in the context of perpetration liability.
First of all, it is unclear what kind of normative position it is to be changed
by committing a crime. Secondly, it is ambiguous how the position is
changed. Some scholars observe that the intentionality of the defendant must
lead to the changes in the normative position of the perpetrator.73 However,
70

Miller, HCA 30 at ¶ 84 (Justice Gageler dissenting).
Id. at ¶ 33. The alternative view, proposed by Professor Simester, is that joint
criminal enterprise is a sui generis form of secondary participation in a crime and not
merely a sub-species of accessorial liability. See generally Simester, supra note 10.
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based on the notion of intentionality, the theory encounters problems when
applied “to impulsive conduct or acts done in temper.” 74 Even if its
inapplicability in such cases is ignored, the advocators of this theory do not
clearly state how the normative position has been changed in other
circumstances, because an intention to commit a specific crime does not
indicate an intention to bring any harm of any description. There is a big
moral difference between a person facing the consequences of his own
personal acts and facing the consequences of the autonomous and
independent conduct of another.75
The change of normative position theory cannot provide a
convincing justification for constructive liability in the context of individual
perpetration liability; it can do this no better in the context of extended joint
criminal enterprise liability, where the defendant will be held liable for the
conduct of the independent and autonomous perpetrator over which the
defendant has no control at all. Professor John Gardner, the original author
of the change of normative position theory, has not only abandoned his
original assertions on the theory but has also repudiated any suggestion that
his aim was to present a positive justification for constructive liability.
Gardner writes:
I suggested a possible way of thinking about constructive
crimes. I said that by committing the lesser crime one
“changes one’s normative position” such that a certain
outcome that would not otherwise have counted . . . now
counts against one, and adds to one’s crime. . . . I regret that
my remark about “changing one’s normative position” was
taken . . . to be an attempt at offering a “substantive moral
justification for any constructive criminal liability. . . . I only
meant to analyse the law’s own moral outlook. I meant . . . to
set out the thing that needs to be justified rather than the
justification.76

Culpability in Criminal Law, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 232, 243 (2008); Jeremy Horder,
A Critique of the Correspondence Principle in Criminal Law, 1995 CRIM. L. REV. 759,
763–65 (1995).
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Ashworth, supra note 73, at 244.
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See BAKER, supra note 3, at 82.
76
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Simester and others 77 have seized Gardner’s analysis of the law’s
moral outlook concerning constructive liability as a substantive justification
for not only permitting constructive liability, but also for dispensing with the
conduct element in complicity, which should be either assistance or
encouragement. The only check such a position puts on liability by mere
association is foresight. Hence, association plus foresight is sufficient to
convict a person of murder in Australia. 78 These scholars have
misunderstood Gardner and have put forward a vacuous assertion as a
positive justification for the extended joint enterprise doctrine. This Article
submits that the arguments by Baker and also more generally by Gardner79
and Professor Andrew Ashworth80 are far more convincing. It is difficult to
see how the normative position explanation can provide a substantive
justification for the unjust form of criminalization that this extended
doctrine of joint enterprise liability permits.
In addition to using the unsound justification of change of normative
position theory, the majority judge in Miller gives conservative policy
reasons for not adopting the legal interpretation of the law as presented by
the Supreme Court in R v Jogee.81 In that case, the law was interpreted by
drawing on the existing precedents, not policy opinions that are not
underwritten with solid empirical research.82 The lack of empirical research
to support these bold policy claims is just one reason that those policy
justifications should not have been invoked to interpret the law. In extreme
cases, policy might compel a court to reduce the scope of the criminal law,
but it should never give a court permission to extend the criminal law. It is
an ancient common law principle that doubtful law be interpreted in favour
of the defendant. Moreover, neither precedent nor policy empowers a court
to create new common law doctrines of criminal liability.83
77

Horder & Hughes, supra note 10, at 398.
It has been suggested that joint enterprise liability “allows a form of ‘guilt by
association’ or ‘guilt by simple presence without more.’ Nothing in McAuliffe supports
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The majority judgment in Miller adopted the policy considerations in
R v Powell,84 asserting that the goal of crime control provides good reasons
for maintaining the doctrine of extended joint enterprise. 85 However,
adopting the extended joint enterprise doctrine produces extreme injustice
and unfairness, as a defendant would be labelled and punished in the same
way as the perpetrator when the defendant’s wrongdoing should be labelled
and punished as a distinct crime. Under the extended joint enterprise
doctrine, such a person would not be deterred from killing because he did
not perpetrate the actus reus of the collateral crime. 86 Punishing a
participant in a joint enterprise for any collateral crime he foresaw as a
possibility may serve the purpose of general deterrence if it gives the
general public a signal that joining a criminal joint enterprise is something
they should avoid. But such a deterrence goal is already targeted by
punishing the defendant for participating in the underlying crime.
The policy arguments in Miller, which were given by the High Court
to defend its decision not to reinterpret the law to reconcile it with centuries
of common law authorities and contemporary standards of justice, show that
The High Court misunderstood its role. The High Court is not a legislature,
and therefore its role is not to look at the wider policy arguments that might
justify legislative reform. Rather its job is to interpret the specific legal
doctrines before it by drawing on precedents. For an example of one of its
wide policy justifications, The High Court stated:
Importantly, in Clayton it was said that no change should be
undertaken to the law of extended joint criminal enterprise
without examining the whole of the law with respect to
secondary liability for crime. As was observed, it would be
undesirable to alter the doctrine as it applies to the law of
homicide, which is its principal area of application, without
consideration of whether the common law of murder should
be amended to distinguish between killing with intent to kill
and killing with intent to cause really serious injury. 87

14 (2014).
84
R v Powell [1999] 1 AC 1, 19–20 (HL) (U.K.).
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Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, ¶ 145 (Austl.).
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This statement is followed by three more paragraphs stating that the
entire law would have to be considered and that changes in the law should
not be made without reforming the entire law of complicity.88 It refers to the
sort of policy and big picture arguments that are in the remit of law
commissions and parliaments. Some of the other policy “assertions” stated
in Miller for not overruling McAuliffe included that it would cause great
inconvenience, since many wrongly convicted parties might appeal, and
there wasn’t any substantive injustice in the current law. 89 These sorts of
wider policy considerations are not the business of the courts. “Judges ought
to remember that their office is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to interpret law,
and not to make law, or give law.”90
The High Court was not bound to follow the Supreme Court and
Privy Council decisions in R v Jogee and Ruddock, but those decisions
should have been much more persuasive than they were. This is especially
true, considering the compelling academic research on the point and taking
into account that the Supreme Court of the United States recently noted how
the early English authorities mandated that the mens rea for complicity
liability is intention. 91 It is also incongruous that The High Court instead
decided to apply the decision in R v Powell, which was overruled for being
an erroneous decision.92 Not only did The High Court pay no attention to the
common law as it existed before Chan Wing-Siu, it also relied on a very
narrow selection of academic works and terse case commentaries. 93 Perhaps
the most controversial argument invoked was Simester’s “change of
normative position” theory. 94 Justice Keane was also in the majority but
gave a separate judgment, the controversial and flawed reasoning of which
will be discussed in the next section of this article.
The High Court failed to provide a precedential justification, let
alone a positive normative justification, for its extension of the criminal law
in Miller. Specifically, it did not provide a justification that is supported by
88

Id. at ¶ 41 – 43.
Id. “The submissions are in abstract form and do not identify decided cases in which
it can be seen that extended joint criminal enterprise liability has occasioned injustice.”
Id. at ¶ 39.
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the common law precedents or by any other principles of justice. In the
older Australian authorities, there is no precedent that replaces the assistance
and encouragement requirement for complicity liability with a conduct
element that requires nothing more than association. 95 These same
authorities also support interpreting the mental element in complicity as
limiting liability to intentional assistance and encouragement. 96 The High
Court invoked the change of normative position theory to defend a doctrine
of extended joint enterprise that it acknowledged was created by judicial fiat
in 1995.97 Consequently, the High Court should have developed a positive
normative or precedential justification to show the validity and justice of
adopting this approach.
The interpretative methodology adopted by The High Court in Miller
was unorthodox. In the 21st century, it is unexpected that Supreme Court
decisions from the United Kingdom and the United States, drawing on
centuries of common law precedents, are given no persuasive influence. The
appeal was from the common law jurisdiction of South Australia.98 South
Australia is a common law jurisdiction where, until 1986, an appeal could
be made to the Privy Council. 99 When appeals were made to the Privy
Council, the Board of the Council drew on the English common law
authorities to resolve legal issues. There have been no appeals to the Privy
Council from Australia since 1980 and the expense of appealing to London
has been such a deterrent that there have not been any criminal law appeals
since the 1964 appeal in Parker v The Queen.
Nevertheless, Parker used the common law method of drawing on
English precedents to contextualise and historicize the law as a part of the

95

See generally R v Johns (1978) 1 NSWLR 284 (Austl.); R v Doorey (1970) 3
NSWLR 351 (Austl.); R v Surridge (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 278 (Austl.); R v Dunn
(1930) 30 SR (NSW) 210 (Austl.); R v Kalinowski (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 377 (Austl.);
R v Grand (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 216 (Austl.); R v Adams [1932] VLR 222 (Austl.); R v
Dowdle (1900) 26 VLR 637 (Austl.).
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See, e.g., McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 ALJR 621 (Austl.).
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See generally KENNETH J ARENSON ET AL., AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL LAW IN THE
COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed., 2014).
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interpretive approach. 100 In that case the Privy Council drew on ancient
English authorities to build a narrative for interpreting the law within the
common law context in which it evolved. 101 Moreover, this Article has
submitted that many watertight authorities from Australia’s common law
jurisdictions convincingly underwrite the reasoning adopted by the
majorities in R v Jogee and Ruddock.102 The same precedents convincingly
undermine the majority decision of The High Court in Miller.
II. PERPETRATION VS. ASSISTING OR ENCOURAGING
In Miller, Justice Keane starts his separate judgment by suggesting
that intention is required for standard complicity and that “the criminal
responsibility of a participant in a joint criminal enterprise is grounded in
the authorisation of a crime which is incidental to the enterprise.” 103 But
Justice Keane does not explain how one can recklessly authorize. One
cannot accidentally, negligently, or recklessly authorize, even if one might
negligently or recklessly send a message of encouragement. Authorization
has to be intentional. If you authorize something then the concept of
“authorize” suggests a desire or purpose that it happen.104 To authorize is to
approve or permit, suggesting that the defendant gives his permission—this
the defendant cannot do accidentally or recklessly, since that would not be
any permission at all. It would be a putative permission based on the
perpetrator’s mistaken belief that the defendant is genuinely authorizing or
permitting the perpetrator’s action. Justice Keane then asserts that
Australian law recognises that criminal liability should be proportionate to
individual culpability, but that this can be achieved by making a person who
recklessly associates with a murderer liable for a murder perpetrated by that
murderer:
In particular, where two or more persons agree to commit a
crime together knowing that its execution includes the risk of
the commission of another crime in the course of its
100
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execution, there is no obvious reason, in terms of individual
moral culpability, why the person who commits the actus
reus should bear primary criminal responsibility, as between
himself or herself and the other participants to the joint
criminal enterprise, for the incidental crime. Because of the
fact of the agreement to carry out jointly the criminal
enterprise, the person who commits the actus reus of the
incidental crime is necessarily acting as the instrument of the
other participants to deal with the foreseen exigencies of
carrying their enterprise into effect.105
Justice Keane then goes on to expound some sort of agency theory:
Where parties commit to a joint criminal enterprise, each
participant becomes, by reason of that commitment, both the
principal and the agent of the other participants: for the
purposes of that enterprise they are partners in crime. Each
participant also necessarily authorises those acts which he or
she foresees as possible incidents of carrying out the
enterprise in which he or she has agreed, and continues, to
participate.106
It seems that Justice Keane was confused about the difference
between moral culpability and legal culpability and the difference between
perpetration and assistance or encouragement. He also seems to conflate
joint perpetration with assistance or encouragement. 107 Moreover, Justice
Keane seems to misunderstand the difference between innocent agency and
perpetration.108 Those who participate in criminal joint enterprises are not
mere instruments in the hands of each other—they are not innocent agents
but fully autonomous wrongdoers. They are self-governing and selfdetermining agents. Liberal states do not adhere to the notion of collective
agency. 109 Justice Keane’s reference to organised crime is also unhelpful, as
it involves many conceptual aspects and distinctions that make it very
different from standard complicity. Most jurisdictions have enacted special
105
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provisions to tackle organized crime,110 and it is unhelpful to discuss it in
the context of complicity; such a discussion is not relevant or helpful for
interpreting the law of complicity, because it is a conceptually distinct form
of wrongdoing.
By and large joint enterprises do not involve organised crime, but
usually involve a couple of criminals engaging in a robbery or even some
lawful activity. There are a couple of high profile cases involving gangs of
youths where an escalation of violence has resulted in a murder by one of
the gang, but such cases are not the norm.
In the earlier High Court case of Miller v The Queen,111 D drove P to
locations, such as parks, so he could have sexual relations with prostitutes. P
started to kill the prostitutes and D with this knowledge continued to assist
him by driving him to the locations. D knew that P had started to randomly
kill some of the women, but continued to help. In this case, P was hardly an
instrument of D, nor was D a joint perpetrator. The enterprise was lawful
since it involved consensual sexual relations between two adults. P did not
intend to kill on many occasions, but merely intended to have consensual
sex. It could be inferred that D conditionally intended to assist P to kill
whenever the compulsion struck P, since D had full knowledge of what was
taking place but chose to continue to assist.112 To argue that P was merely
D’s instrument in such case is erroneous. 113
An accessory is deemed equally liable as a principal when the
perpetrator intended to kill (or perpetrate whatever crime was committed)
using his own hands, while the accessory did not intend to kill and did not in
fact cause the death, but merely intended that the perpetrator intentionally
kill (or in Australia was reckless as to whether the perpetrator might kill)
and intentionally assisted or encouraged the perpetrator. The law deems that
the defendant intended to kill and that he killed with his own hands; it is on
that fiction that he is held equally liable for the crime committed by the
actual perpetrator. These deeming provisions are based on a legal fiction
that the defendant personally killed and personally intended to kill, when
110
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that is not the case. Justice Keane seems to assert that this means no moral
distinction should be drawn between the parties to a crime. For Justice
Keane, they should all be deemed principals at all stages of the inquiry.
A.

Assisting or Encouraging does not Cause the Prohibited Harm in the
Target Crime

Justice Keane’s interpretation, however, is not true. A person who
assists or encourages the commission of a crime is an assister or encourager
of that the crime, not a perpetrator of that crime. This begs the question, why
is participation different from perpetration? The core difference between
participation and perpetration is that the latter causes the prohibited criminal
harm while the former merely contributes to the prohibited harm by
assisting or encouraging the independent and autonomous perpetrator. The
accessory is one step removed from the prohibited harm, and the
perpetrator’s free, deliberate, and autonomous perpetration has broken any
chain of causation between the accessory and the prohibited harm. The
canonical statement of the difference between perpetration and participation
is provided by Professor Glanville Williams. Williams states:
[t]he novus actus doctrine is at the root of the law of
complicity . . ..Principals cause, accomplices encourage (or
otherwise influence) or help. If the instigator were regarded
as causing the result he would be a principal, and the
conceptual division between principals (or, as I prefer to call
them, perpetrators) and accessories would vanish. Indeed, it
was because the instigator was not regarded as causing the
crime that the notion of accessories had to be developed. This
is the irrefragable argument for recognising the novus actus
principle as one of the bases of our criminal law.114
The House of Lords in the leading case R v Kennedy (No.2) held:
[t]he criminal law generally assumes the existence of free
will . . .. But, generally speaking, informed adults of sound
mind are treated as autonomous beings able to make their
own decisions how they will act . . .. Thus D is not to be
treated as causing V to act in a certain way if V makes a
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voluntary and informed decision to act in that way rather than
another. 115
Hart and Honoré also came to a similar conclusion in their famous
treatise on causation.116 The rule that free, voluntary, and informed human
actions can break the chain of causation has been confirmed as a principle
that is “fundamental and not controversial.”117 In the context of complicity,
the perpetrator, and only the perpetrator, directly causes the end criminal
harm; he causes it directly through his personal actions. Moreover, the free,
informed, and autonomous action theory deals with fully culpable agents,
isolating them from the special case of innocent agents. The assister’s (or
encourager’s) action is in the background and has no direct influence on the
end criminal harm—the criminal harm is contingent on the perpetrator’s
choice to use the assistance supplied or to listen to the encouragement that is
proffered.
To illustrate: the defendant supplies the perpetrator with bullets and
the perpetrator puts these in his gun and uses these particular bullets to kill
the victim.118 The defendant has assisted the perpetrator, but the defendant
has not caused the perpetrator to load the gun and kill the victim.119 The
perpetrator has caused himself to be armed and caused himself to aim at the
human target and pull the trigger.120 Provided the perpetrator was not insane
or under duress or deception, he or she made a fully informed and
autonomous choice to kill another human being, independent of the
defendant’s actions.
According to Gardner, “there is no way of contributing to any result,
directly or indirectly, except causally. That is the only kind of contribution
to results that exists, and since the only kind of complicity is complicity by
contribution to results, complicity is always a kind of causal wrong.” 121
115
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Gardner argues that accessories cause through the conduct of the
perpetrator, 122 but what Gardner seems to call indirect causation cannot
really be conceptualised as causation. People who have argued that
accessories can “cause” use a word “in a special or technical sense that need
not conform to our ordinary use of the word, while still trading on what we
normally mean by it.” 123 Causation, as used by Gardner in analyzing
complicity liability, is not the central type of causal relationship referred to
in perpetration liability; instead, it is understood in a more tenuous sense.124
Professor Michael Moore also argues that an intervening act does not
actually break the chain of causation, but it is construed to be so because
some reasons of legal policy make it justified that an intervening act does
break the chain of causation. 125 Professor G.R. Sullivan holds a very similar
viewpoint to that of Moore. 126 But this argument is unconvincing and
indefensible as long as perpetration liability is still the core of criminal
liability. It has long been recognized that one’s conduct is deemed to be an
autonomous and free choice if it is not done under deception or coercion.127
Free, voluntary human actions cannot be caused, even if it could be said in a
sense to be heavily influenced by another, 128 because human beings are
totally sovereign over their own actions and human actions are treated
differently from natural events.129
It is the thrust of this Article that causation rules are understood as
they currently stand in the paradigm criminal liability form, which is
perpetration liability; and causation’s two prongs in that form are but-for
cause and legal cause. Therefore, the one who has caused the prohibited
harm in the crime is in fact the perpetrator rather than the assister or
encourager, if the two prongs of causation rules are applied. Assistance or
122
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encouragement in many cases will not be the but-for cause of the prohibited
harm in the target crime,130 let alone the legal cause of that harm. This is
because, in many cases, the perpetrator would commit the target crime
anyway, even if he did not get assistance or encouragement from the
accessory. In some cases, the assistance or encouragement is essential and
indispensable. For example, “the brilliant scientist . . . [D] purposely
provides . . . [P] with the means to blow up the city of Los Angeles, which
outcome would have been well beyond . . . [P’s or any ordinary person’s]
expertise or capacity . . . [but for D’s] assistance.”131 It is plausible to say
that, but for the accessory’s help, the perpetrator would not have committed
the crime as he did. However, it would be problematic to say that the
defendant’s assistance is the legal cause of the eventual harm, because the
perpetrator’s bombing of the city is a free, voluntary, and informed human
intervention and can therefore break the chain of causation between the
defendant’s facilitation and the resulting death. “The reason why complicity
emerges as a separate ground of liability is that causation doctrine cannot
generally deal satisfactorily with results that take the form of another
person’s voluntary action.” 132 If causation is understood as it stands in
perpetration liability, then there is no causation between an accessory’s
assisting or encouraging and the prohibited harm in the target crime.
B.

Assisting or Encouraging as a Remote Harm

Perpetration (depending on the crime) almost always involves direct
criminal harm-doing. In a case of murder, it involves the victim’s life being
deprived. In a case of rape, it involves a victim’s sexual autonomy being
violated. In a case of robbery, it involves a victim suffering injury and losing
property. However, assisting or encouraging almost never involves any
direct criminal harm-doing. It is possible to think of examples where the
encouragement or assistance is criminal in itself,133 but in most cases the
130
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encouragement or assistance is not harmful or criminal. The harmfulness of
assisting or encouraging is contingent on the perpetrator’s independent and
autonomous choice to use that assistance or encouragement to perpetrate the
target crime.
The defendant’s encouragement or assistance, even when substantial
and culpable, is less dangerous than perpetration, because it is contingent on
another person being willing to follow through. No empirical study has ever
been conducted on cases of inchoate assistance and encouragement, but one
would suspect there are many cases where assistance or encouragement is
given without the perpetrator acting on it. If this can be proven empirically,
then that would be evidence of the fact that harmless conduct (remote
harms) that are only harmful by slightly increasing the risk of a perpetrator’s
success are less dangerous and wrongful than acts of direct perpetration.
This Article’s thesis is buttressed by the remote harms theory as
sketched above. There are several kinds of situations involving remote
harms such as abstract endangerment, intervening choices, and accumulative
harms.134 For present purposes the focus is on the second category of remote
harm, where the harm occurs when another person’s innocuous conduct
becomes remotely harmful because it helps another or encourages another to
commit a crime. The crux of the matter is that the accessory’s participation
is a remote harm in that its harmfulness and wrongfulness is contingent on
the perpetrator making an independent choice to commit the target crime.
The harmfulness of perpetration is certain because it initiates the prohibited
harm; the harmfulness of participation is not certain in itself, but is
contingent on the perpetrator’s choice. Therefore, participation is less
harmful than perpetration.
Another aspect of this is that remote contributions are far less
dangerous than direct contributions. As moral agents, people have the
capacity to choose to violate the law or not.135 The perpetrator is made fully
liable because he unjustifiably and inexcusably chose to kill the victim or
chose to perpetrate some other criminal harm. The perpetrator is more
134
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dangerous not only because he has the will to kill, whereas the assister or
encourager only has the nerve and will to assist or encourage, but also
because the perpetrator has direct control over the end harm. It is the
perpetrator who controls and decides whether the end harm will be brought
about, not the remote harmer (assister or encourager). Accessories have no
control over whether their assistance will be used or whether their
encouragement will be adhered to, unless they use duress or fraud, which
would lead to direct liability through the innocent or semi-innocent agent
doctrines. 136 The accessory leaves the act in the hands of another
autonomous agent and is one step removed from the direct control that is
required to bring about the prohibited harm in the target crime. The
accessory leaves it all to chance. Accessories have only increased the risk
that the target crime might be committed by providing assistance or
encouragement. The end result is fully dependent on the perpetrator and
what he decides to do when the moment for perpetration comes.
People have control over their choices and therefore are subject to
liability and punishment for the harms they choose to produce.137 A person
should not be made fully liable for what he cannot control. 138 The law
should be very hesitant to punish a person for conduct that is not within his
control. The accessory only controls his act of assisting or encouraging and
he should be punished for that wrongdoing only. The decision of whether
the target crime will be committed is in the hands of the perpetrator. The
136
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assister or encourager has no control over the perpetrator, let alone the
occurrence of the prohibited harm in the target crime. Furthermore, the
assister or encourager is likely a person who does not have the fortitude or
resolve to perpetrate the actus reus of the crime himself. This kind of person
is not as dangerous as a person who has the fortitude and resolve to directly
perpetrate the crime.
There is a moral difference between intending to assist or encourage
and intending to perpetrate. If a given defendant intends to kill a victim and
picks up a knife and pushes it through the victim’s heart, that defendant is in
a very different “state of evilness of mind” (motivation to directly kill a
human being up front and live) than another defendant who has merely
supplied the knife intentionally, but is a person who would never himself to
do the killing, as he does not have the evilness of mind, nerve, or
psychology to directly kill using his own hands and is only able to intend
such an act to be done through the autonomous free acts of another. It is
easier to imagine killing someone than to actually do it. The person who
merely assisted or encouraged another to kill might be one who could never
kill if he had to use his own hands to do the dirty work. If not, and he kills,
then he should be punished for his personal wrongdoing as a murderer. But
so long as he remains a remote assister or encourager there is no case for
deeming him a murderer.
III. REJECTING THE DOCTRINE OF EXTENDED JOINT ENTERPRISE
Treating an assister or encourager fully liable in the same way as the
perpetrator for the crime assisted or encouraged goes against the principles
of fair labelling 139 and proportionate punishment. 140 A person who has
assisted rape is not a rapist because he does not penetrate the victim, and
assisting rape is one step removed from the penetration. Therefore,
punishing an assister of rape the same as the rapist does not reflect the
nature and degree of the assister’s wrongdoing.
139
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The doctrine of extended joint enterprise liability is even worse. It
makes a defendant fully liable as the perpetrator for the collateral crime,
when the defendant did not perpetrate, assist or encourage the perpetration,
or even intend such a crime to be committed. The full criminal liability for
the collateral crime is based on a legal fiction that, by participating in the
underlying crime, he has provided assistance or encouragement to the
collateral crime automatically. The defendant’s participation in the
underlying crime is regarded as assisting or encouraging the collateral crime
and this fictitiously constructed assistance or encouragement is then
construed as sufficient actus reus of the collateral crime. Moreover, the
defendant’s mere foresight that the collateral crime might be committed is
construed as an intention to assist or encourage with knowledge of all the
essential matters of the collateral crime. This fictitiously constructed mens
rea is further construed as the required mens rea for the collateral crime.
The defendant is therefore labelled and punished much more than his
personal harm-doing and personal culpability would warrant.
Retributive justice and utilitarianism require that the crime label and
punishment should reflect the defendant’s past harm-doing and personal
culpability. 141 Criminal law has an expressive function, 142 communicating
the society’s disapproval and condemnation of certain conduct to the
defendant, the victims and their families, legal professionals as well as the
general public. Therefore, labelling and punishing the defendant in
accordance with his personal wrong-doing and individual culpability is
necessary if this communicative function is to be achieved. It matters that
the defendant is not just convicted and punished but also that he is labelled
and punished to the degree he deserves. Obedience to and respect of the
criminal law is better achieved when people accept and approve of the law
than when they draw only on their own moral convictions.
141
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Based on the abovementioned analysis, the wrongdoing of assisting
or encouraging is less than that of perpetrating, so even if the levels of
culpability for assisting or encouraging and perpetrating are not substantially
separate (for instance both defendant and perpetrator intend that the victim
should be killed), the crime label and punishment should still be less for
assisting or encouraging. Labelling and punishing assisters or encouragers in
the same way as perpetrators does not reflect their personal wrong-doing,
which is assisting or encouraging rather than perpetrating, and their
individual culpability, which is not the same as the mens rea in the target
crime.
A person who assisted or encouraged another to murder, for
example, is not a murderer in fact and therefore should not be labelled and
punished as a murderer. Additionally, his intention to assist or encourage the
perpetrator’s commission of murder is not the same as intending to kill or
cause great bodily harm by his own hands. Labelling and punishing assisters
or encouragers in the same way as the perpetrator attaches more stigma than
their wrong-doing deserves. Such unfairness and injustice is aggravated in
the context of extended joint enterprise liability for a person who, although
only assisting or encouraging an underlying crime, is made fully liable as a
perpetrator for the collateral crime, which he did not perpetrate, assist or
encourage its perpetration, or intend to be committed. Assisting or
encouraging a crime is less harmful than perpetrating the crime, and risking
another’s commission of a crime is less than assisting or encouraging the
commission of that crime; therefore, risking another’s perpetration of an
offense is far less than perpetrating that offense.
It is now clear that Lords Steyn and Mustill (in R v Powell) were
mistaken in thinking they were bound to apply the evidential maxim of
foresight of possibility as a substantive fault element in complicity (i.e., they
were mistaken to think that Sir Robin Cooke’s interpretation of the law as
stated in Chan Wing-Siu was right and that they were bound by it).
However, the difference between those Lords and the majority in Miller is
that those Lords were very open about the fact that they thought the law they
were bound to state was extremely unfair. 143 The difference between the
decision in R v Jogee and the decision in Miller is that R v Jogee interpreted
the law so that it could be reconciled with centuries of common law
143
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precedents. Principles of justice akin to those mentioned by Justice
Gageler, 144 Justice Kirby, 145 and, most significantly, by leading academic
experts also add weight to the case, but the decision in R v Jogee rests
simply on an application of the historical precedents. It does not rest on
policy arguments nor judicial activism, 146 but straightforwardly on legal
interpretation. Similarly, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Rosemond v. US draws on centuries of precedents, including the
English law authorities cited by Justice Learned Hand in United States v.
Peoni,147 rather than policy arguments to hold that the mental element in
complicity is intention.148 Policy arguments are the business of parliament,
not that of judges, who are meant to interpret law according to precedents
and principles of justice. Peoni itself was argued as a natural probable
consequence case, but Justice Learned Hand, tracing the law back as far as
Bracton, held that the mental element in complicity is intention. 149 The
Supreme Court of the United States, in Rosemond, held that Learned Hand’s
statement of the law was correct and applied it.150 Moreover, a number of
the world’s leading criminal law experts have argued that the precedents
require intention.151 If anything, the decision in Miller helps to highlight
injustices and the urgent need for law reform in Australia.
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The fairness and just demand in criminal law also has its bearing in
U.S. law regarding the natural probable consequence rule, which works in a
way similar to but stricter than the extended joint enterprise doctrine. In the
United States, if labelling and punishing a person for the collateral crime as
a perpetrator, based on his participation in an underlying crime and his
foresight of the collateral crime, infringes the requirement of fair labelling
and proportionate punishment that retributive justice seeks to achieve, then
labelling and punishing a person as a perpetrator based merely on his
participation in an underlying crime, with nothing more, should be
absolutely prohibited. 152 The natural and probable consequence rule was
applied in a time when the death penalty and the felony murder rule were in
full force and when there were no clear distinctions drawn between
recklessness, intention, and oblique intention as substantive fault elements.
The rule is found only in a few jurisdictions and is by and large applied to
facts where there was intention. Professor Kadish has pointed out the link
between extended joint enterprise complicity and the felony murder rule:
It also shares a resemblance to the American felony-murder
rule, long since abandoned in England, which is a particular
application of the lesser-crime doctrine to murder: a killing
committed in the course of a felony (nowadays only certain
felonies) becomes murder even if, apart from the felony, it
would be manslaughter or not criminal at all.153
Such harsh and unjust law should be abolished in the 21st century.
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In light of the unsound decision in Miller v The Queen, it is hoped
that the relevant parliaments in Australia will consider wholesale reform. If
that were to happen, this Article argues that the principled way forward is to
completely abolish the doctrine of extended joint enterprise and replace it
with a lesser offense that labels and punishes the defendant according to his
own harm-doing and personal culpability.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of extended joint enterprise arose from the need to
make an accessory liable for an unintended crime committed by the
perpetrator. It was an unreasonable stretch of the law based mainly on policy
grounds. The new development in the common law world indicates a
demand for a requirement of intention for complicity liability: a person
should not be made liable for a crime committed by his confederate if he did
not intend such a crime to be committed with his assistance or
encouragement.154 However, the Australian court in Miller refused to follow
R v Jogee, instead holding that the change of normative position theory and
the pragmatic policy considerations can fairly justify the doctrine of
extended joint enterprise.
Foster and Stephen are misquoted in Miller by the majority
judgment. The old English law required nothing other than intention for
complicity liability. Chan Wing-Siu had extended the law unreasonably
wide, which has now been corrected by the Supreme Court of England and
Wales in R v Jogee. The court in Miller did not provide valid precedential or
convincing principle justifications for extended joint enterprise liability.
The change of normative position theory cannot justify extended
joint enterprise liability. One’s participation in an underlying crime cannot
be construed automatically as participation in a collateral crime, let alone
deemed as the actus reus of the collateral crime; one’s foresight of a
collateral crime cannot equal an intention to assist or encourage the
collateral crime, nor can it equal the mens rea of the collateral crime.
The pragmatic policy grounds used in Miller cannot override the
requirements of basic criminal law principles such as fair labelling,
proportionate punishment, and personal culpability. The alleged deterrence
effect of extended joint enterprise doctrine is not empirically proved. More
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importantly, courts should not aim to obtain easy prosecution at the cost of
justice and fairness. Fair and just criminalization serves deterrence purposes
as well or better.
The extended joint enterprise doctrine goes against the basic
requirements of retributive justice. It fails to label and punish the defendant
for his own personal wrongdoing and individual culpability and therefore
should be abolished. A person who participated in an underlying crime
while foreseeing the commission of a collateral crime merely took the risk
that such a crime might be committed. He is not the perpetrator of that
crime, nor is he the assister or encourager of that crime. Such risk-taking
conduct should not be labelled and punished as perpetration of that collateral
crime. If there is any need to criminalize such risk-taking, it is better done
with a new, lesser offense. It is hoped that relevant parliaments in Australia
will abolish this extremely unfair doctrine and replace it with an offense that
could fairly represent the defendant’s wrongdoing and personal culpability.

